A. W. Pink the “Rationalist”

[This post originally appeared at Scripturalism.com]

The following quote from A.W. Pink is representative of Christianity down through the ages. Sadly, many today (even reformed) reject this view as “rationalism.”

The exposition made of any verse in Holy Writ must be in entire agreement with the Analogy of Faith, or that system of truth which God has made known unto His people. That, of course, calls for a comprehensive knowledge of the contents of the Bible—sure proof that no novice qualified to preach to or attempt to teach others. Such comprehensive knowledge can be obtained only by a systematic and constant reading of the Word itself—and only then is any man fitted to weigh the writings of others! Since all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, there are no contradictions therein; thus it obviously follows that any explanation given of a passage which clashes with the plain teaching of other verses is manifestly erroneous. In order for any interpretation to be valid, it must be in perfect keeping with the scheme of Divine Truth. One part of the Truth is mutually related to and dependent upon others, and therefore there is full accord between them. As Bengel said of the books of Scripture, “They indicate together one beautiful, harmonious and gloriously connected system of Truth.”

Interpretation of the Scriptures (HT: Reformedontheweb)

The same belief is found in Owen as well:

We have seen that there are some difficult passages in the Bible, occurring frequently but irregularly throughout the Scriptures, and so there are some apparent contradictions scattered therein which are to be diligently searched into and reconciled—something which can only be achieved by legitimate interpretation.

(Biblical Theology, p. 814).

Commenting on this, Jeffrey T. Riddle notes:

Indeed, the path of pre-critical interpreters was to seek rationally satisfying harmonization in the face of “apparent contradictions.”  For Owen solutions can only come through diligent and faithful interpretation.

This is the approach of the ARBCA Theological Committee paper on Divine Impassibility:

1. We affirm the unity and analogy of Scripture, which states that unclear, difficult, or ambiguous passages are to be interpreted with clear and unambiguous passages that touch upon the same teaching or event (2LCF 1.9). We deny that the purported meaning of any text may be pressed in isolation or contradiction to other passages of Scripture.

2. We affirm the unity of Scripture and the analogy of faith, which states, “the true and full sense of any Scripture” (2LCF 1.9) must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the system of doctrine “necessarily contained” (2LCF 1.6) in the whole of Scripture. We deny that the purported meaning of any text may be pressed in isolation or contradiction to systematic theological considerations and that which is necessarily contained in the whole of Scripture.

Compare with Robert Reymond’s section on “Paradox as a Hermeneutical Category”

Let no one conclude from this rejection of paradox (as Marston has defined it) as a legitimate hermeneutical category that I am urging a Cartesian rationalism that presupposes the autonomy of human reason and freedom from divine revelation, a rationalism which asserts that it must begin with itself in the build-up of knowledge. But make no mistake: I am calling for a Christian rationalism that forthrightly affirms that the divine revelation which it gladly owns and makes the bedrock of all its intellectual efforts is internally self-consistent, that is, noncontradictory. Christians believe that their God is rational, that is, that he is logical. This means that he thinks and speaks in a way that indicates that the laws of logic—the law of identity (A is A), the law of noncontradiction (A is not non-A), and the law of excluded middle (A is either A or non-A)—are laws of thought original with and intrinsic to himself. This means that his knowledge is self-consistent. And because he is a God of truth he will not, indeed, he cannot lie (see Tit. 1:2; Heb. 6:18). Accordingly, just because God is rational, self-consistent, and always and necessarily truthful, we should assume that his inscripturated propositional revelation to us—the Holy Scripture—is of necessity also rational, self-consistent, and true. That this view of Holy Scripture is a common Christian conviction is borne out, I would suggest, in the consentient willingness by Christians everywhere to affirm that there are no contradictions in Scripture. The church worldwide has properly seen that the rational character of the one living and true God would of necessity have to be reflected in any propositional self-revelation which he determined to give to human beings, and accordingly has confessed the entire truthfulness (inerrancy) and noncontradictory character of the Word of God. Not to set the goal of quarrying from Scripture a harmonious theology devoid of paradoxes is to sound the death knell not only to systematic theology but also to all theology that would commend itself to men as the truth of the one living and rational God.

Reymond, Robert L. (1998-08-09). A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith: 2nd Edition – Revised and Updated (Kindle Locations 2338-2353). Thomas Nelson. Kindle Edition.

Finally, consider John Piper:

But as a matter of fact the only time Paul ever tells people to keep their mouth shut is when they are boasting. If our hearts and our minds pant like a hart after the water-brook of God’s deep mind, it may not be pride, it may be worship. There is not one sentence that I know of in the New Testament which tells us the limits of what we can know of God and his ways… one can only pity the poor souls who, for fear of finding out too much, never approach the sacred mountains but stand off and chirp ironically about how one should preserve and appreciate mystery.

A Response to J.I. Packer on the So-Called Antinomy Between the Sovereignty of God and Human Responsibility

Does Christ Speak Authoritatively Through Preaching?

[This post originally appeared at Scripturalism.com]

Perhaps you have heard a reformed pastor claim that when he stands behind the pulpit and preaches, you must listen because Christ is speaking through him. I have. I find it a bit of an odd claim because they imply there is something unique about their office and their function within the corporate gathering that grants them this authority. For example, in a brief article discussing the difference between preaching and teaching, Barry York says

Speaking for Christ versus speaking of him. Perhaps the most daunting aspect of preaching is that the minister is speaking on behalf of the Lord. Paul makes that clear when he says this of preaching:

How then will they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without someone preaching? And how are they to preach unless they are sent?” (Romans 10:14-15)

James Boice has pointed out that the word “of” in the statement “And how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard?” is not there in the original. Rather, it should read “And how are they to believe in him whom they have never heard?” As men are sent out to preach, Christ through his Spirit is speaking through them. As Paul said elsewhere, “We also thank God constantly for this, that when you received the word of God, which you heard from us, you accepted it not as the word of men but as what it really is, the word of God, which is at work in you believers” (1 Thes. 2:13). Teaching can tell wonderful things about Christ, and every Sunday school class should do so. Yet only duly ordained ministers in preaching can make the authoritative claim that they represent the Lord.

This certainly does not follow from either Romans 10 or 1 Thes. 2. There is nothing about the office of elder that grants them an exclusive claim to be speaking for Christ.

And yet, it is true that Christ speaks authoritatively through preaching. Benjamin Keach said

That which by a just a necessary consequence is deduced from Scripture, is as much the mind of Christ, as what is contained in the express words of Scripture.

The Rector Rectified, 33

Note Owen on Hebrews 1:5.

That it is lawful to draw consequences from Scripture assertions; and such consequences, rightly deduced, are infallibly true and “de fide.” Thus from the name given unto Christ, the apostle deduceth by just consequence his exaltation and pre-eminence above angels. Nothing will rightly follow from truth but what is so also, and that of the same nature with the truth from whence it is derived. So that whatever by just consequence is drawn from the Word of God, is itself also the Word of God, and truth infallible. And to deprive the church of this liberty in the interpretation of the Word, is to deprive it of the chiefest benefit intended by it. This is that on which the whole ordinance of preaching is founded; which makes that which is derived out of the Word to have the power, authority, and efficacy of the Word accompanying it. Thus, though it be the proper work and effect of the Word of God to quicken, regenerate, sanctify and purify the elect, — and the Word primarily and directly is only that which is written in the Scriptures, — yet we find all these effects produced in and by the preaching of the Word, when perhaps not one sentence of the Scripture is verbatim repeated. And the reason hereof is, because whatsoever is directly deduced and delivered according to the mind and appointment of God from the Word is the Word of God, and hath the power, authority, and efficacy of the Word accompanying it.

It is not the office that determines the authority of preaching, but whether or not the preacher makes correct deductions from Scripture. And this same authority is true anytime anyone makes a statement that is correctly deduced from Scripture, whether they are ordained or not, whether it is in the corporate gathering or not. Thus, contrary to York, teaching can speak for Christ just as much as preaching can. Note Augustine “Yes it is I who admonish, I who order, I who command, it is the bishop who teaches. But it is Christ who commands through me.” “The preacher explains the text; if he says what is true, it is Christ speaking.”

A Necessary Consequence of Fesko’s Defense of Logic

The tide has been shifting in the modern reformed world. Debate over theology proper in reformed circles is finally reaching the question of epistemology. K. Scott Oliphint has argued that, in light of Van Til’s epistemology, “much of systematic theology that’s done, especially in theology proper, needs a complete revision and re-write.” The crux of the issue is the role of logic. Van Til taught that when Scripture presents us with statements that violate the human law of non-contradiction, we must embrace both. We must embrace the paradox with faith that what is contradictory in our minds is not contradictory in God’s mind, whose thoughts are above our thoughts.

When ARBCA stated in its position paper on the doctrine of divine impassibility that Scripture is non-contradictory, they were accused of engaging in natural theology.

We affirm the unity and analogy of Scripture, which states that unclear, difficult, or ambiguous passages are to be interpreted with clear and unambiguous passages that touch upon the same teaching or event (2LCF 1.9). We deny that the purported meaning of any text may be pressed in isolation or contradiction to other passages of Scripture. (26)

Why? Because they were using reason to interpret Scripture, rather than submitting their reason to Scripture. This was, according to critics, Scholastic Thomism. One critic said

The TC [ARBCA Theological Committee] explicitly deny the ideas of ‘tension’, ‘paradox’, ‘antinomy’ in hermeneutics in their Long Paper. Their explanation reveals a hostility to the chastened hermeneutic of the Princeton-Westminster tradition of Vos, Van Til, and Murray – which explicitly rejected scholastic hermeneutics.

The Scholastic Epistemology of Geerhardus Vos

In response to that line of argumentation, J.V. Fesko has written an essay for the RTS Journal titled The Scholastic Epistemology of Geerhardus Vos. He argues that the epistemological connection between Vos and Van Til is unsubstantiated. “This essay presents the thesis that Vos’s use of the pure-mixed articles distinction disproves that Van Til and Vos had the same view of epistemology.”

Vos employed the distinction between pure and mixed articles in his doctrine of creation, a theological distinction that owes its origins to Lombard and was adopted by Aquinas.[11] In brief, articuli puri / mixti derive their origins from the disciplines of theology and philosophy. Those articles derived from theology alone are “pure,” and those that originate from both philosophy and theology are mixed.[12] The idea that stands behind these terms is that human beings acquire some knowledge of God through the use of reason and other knowledge exclusively from special revelation. In other words, this set of terms requires that a theologian define the precise relationship between philosophy and theology. In short, to admit mixed articles means that one employs some form of natural theology.

The example he provides is from the doctrine of creation.

In the first volume of his Reformed Dogmatics Vos treats the doctrine of creation in his sixth chapter. Vos asks a series of questions: What is creation? How do theologians divide the external works of God? Where does the doctrine of miracles belong? In the fourth question Vos poses the following: “Is the doctrine of creation an articulus purus [pure article] or an articulus mixtus [mixed article]?”[32] Vos provides his answer by first explaining his use of terms. Pure articles “are those that cannot be derived both from reason and from revelation but depend entirely on revelation.” Mixed articles, on the other hand, “flow from both reason and revelation.” With his terms defined, Vos zeroes-in on the specific nature of his question: “Whether creation can be proven by reason.” Some have tried to answer the question by starting with the concept of God. God could not have remained enclosed within himself because he needed a world to love. Vos rejects this argument because it would deny God’s aseity. He counters that one can reason from the world up to God, but we cannot descend from God to the world by “logic,” that is, by reason alone. Human reason alone will eventually run out of road and conclude that the creation is mysterious and unique but cannot determine that it arose ex nihilo. Thus, Vos concludes that creation ex nihilo is a pure article; we learn of it solely from special revelation. Vos qualifies his answer, however, by specifying that creatio ex nihilo is a pure article, not the general idea of God’s creation of the universe.[33]

I think Fesko successfully proves his thesis. It echoes the conclusion that I reached in my essay The Silent Shift on WCF 7.1 – Van Til’s epistemology (and misunderstanding of WCF 7.1) was not derived from Vos. I encourage those interested to read the full essay.

The Use of Reason

Fesko helpfully lists ways in which reason was used by some in the reformed tradition.

Early modern Reformed theologians acknowledged the instrumental use of reason in theology… According to Johannes Heidegger (1633-98), reason had a fourfold function with mixed articles. Reason:[28]

  1. Attempts to understand the content of revelation. We receive the word of God in both our hearts and minds.
  2. Defends principles of faith by showing that there are no logical contradictions and refuting the errors created by perverted reason. He aimed this use of reason against other religions such as Judaism and Islam. He traces this aspect from Aquinas to others in his own day such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).
  3. Draws conclusions from revealed principles to confirm one’s faith and salvation from a rational point of view. The apostle Paul used reason in this manner in Acts 14 and 17.
  4. Judges simple things used in the articulation of doctrine, such as natural words and concepts (“man,” “body”) and the construction of propositions from these simple terms. Heidegger illustrates the point with the simple terms of “God” and “blood” and explains that only faith comprehends what Luke states in Acts 20:28, “God acquired the church by his own blood.”

Heidegger then gives a fourfold function of reason in the explication of pure articles. Reason:

  1. Receives God’s revelation—only the spiritual person can do this (1 Cor. 2:24).
  2. Is the instrument of judgment in doctrine concerning what is true and false. This judgment operates according to the rules of good and necessary consequence. The light of Scripture and regenerate reason are necessary to reach correct conclusions.
  3. Formulates doctrine through all means of knowledge: grammar, logic, rhetoric, ethics, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics.
  4. Compares the Old and New Testaments, supernatural and natural revelation, one doctrine with another, and argument with argument.

Clark/Van Til Controversy

All of this has a very interesting, unintended consequence: a necessary re-evaluation of the Clark/Van Til controversy. In the Strimple Festschrift, Edmund P. Clowney says

Another controversy that influenced that development was the debate that emerged between the faculty members of Westminster minster and Dr. Gordon Haddon Clark. Here the division was less between John Murray and Clark and more between Cornelius Van Til and Clark. While a student at Wheaton College (I graduated in 1939), I took all the courses that Dr. Clark offered. While still teaching at the University of Pennsylvania, he had published Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy. Dr. Clark’s history of philosophy presented it as a continuing chess game in which one master after another would pass from the scene, but the game would go on. We kept waiting for the philosopher who would bring the checkmate. In the sequence of his courses, everything pointed toward a contemporary Christian philosopher. Dr. Clark presented Cornelius Van Til as the philosopher to be studied, and referred to a copy of his syllabus. Dr. Van Til, however, concluded that Dr. Clark was a rationalist rather than a presuppositionalist. Van Til pronounced a plague upon both rationalism and irrationalism as positions that made human reason supreme. Instead, we must begin by presupposing the existence of the living and true God, the Creator and Redeemer, the Alpha and Omega of our faith. Both Van Til and Murray emphasized the history of redemption. In chapel talks at Westminster, both showed the influence of Geerhardus Vos’s biblical theology. (Kindle Locations 438-446).

Why was Clark a rationalist? “Dr. Clark has fallen under the spell of rationalism. Rather than subject his reason to the divine Word he insists on logically harmonizing with each other two evident but seemingly contradictory teachings of that Word” (The Complaint). This was “a failure to maintain a qualitative distinction between the knowledge of God and the knowledge possible to man, thus denying the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God and impinging in a most serious fashion upon the transcendence of the Creator over the creature.”

Floyd Hamilton (with Alan Tichenor, Robert Srong, Edwin Rian, and Gordon Clark) wrote The Answer, a defense of Clark in response to The Complaint. It said “without specifically amending our standards any attempt to exalt one method [of apologetics] as alone orthodox and to repudiate all appeal to the a-priori truths of reason is intolerable.” Note carefully his appeal to Hodge and compare with Fesko above.

A.A. Hodge, also, in his Outlines of Theology appeals to reason. On page 19, 8, 2d, he refers to “the light of nature.” Just below he speaks of “the demonstration of the a-priori possibility of a supernatural revelation.” On page 37 he answers Hume by an appeal to “a universal and necessary judgment of reason.” On page 45 he says, “It is certain that the intuitions of necessary truth are the same in all men. They are not generalizations from experience, but presupposed in all experience.” See in particular his defense of natural theology on page 53, 1, 1st, page 54, 2, 2d; also page 61, 10. On page 62, 14, 1st, he also says, “Reason is the primary revelation God has made to man, necessarily presupposed in every subsequent revelation of whatever kind . . . Hence no subsequent revelation can contradict reason acting legitimately within its own sphere . . . To believe is to assent to a thing as true, but to see that it contradicts reason, is to see that it is not (italics his) true.” Again on page 63, 15, 1st, “The first principles of a true philosophy are presupposed in all theology, natural and revealed. 2d, The Holy Scriptures, although not designed primarily to teach philosophy, yet necessarily presuppose and involve the fundamental principles of a true philosophy.”

The result of the controversy was that Dr. Clark was exonerated from the charges of The Complaint. The OPC General Assembly voted 2:1 in favor of Clark. However, he could tell he was quite unwelcome at WTS (where he was planning to teach) so he left the OPC. As a result Van Til’s thought continued to dominate. For more than a generation, reformed Christians have believed that seeking to resolve contradiction in a system of theology is rationalism. Only a few years ago a PCA seminary professor was nearly denied the transfer of his credentials to pastor an OPC church because he disagreed with Van TIl’s epistemology. The tide is shifting as people are finally seeing the problem with Van Til that Clark pointed out for 50 years. Perhaps reformed Christians will now be willing to seriously consider Gordon Clark’s substantial contribution to reformed philosophy (see Doug Douma’s recent biography The Presbyterian Philosopher), seeing that he is not quite the boogeyman he has been made out to be.

A Puritan View of Logic

The following is from Perry Miller’s “The New England Mind” (1939). Miller was an authority on American Purtianism, though some of his understanding of their theology was deficient.


 

CHAPTER V

THE INSTRUMENT OF REASON

In the Puritan view of man, the fall had wrought many melancholy effects, but none so terrible as upon his intellect: “O Grief! that most efficacious instrument for arriving at deeply hidden truth, for asserting it, vindicating it and eliminating all confusion” — that instrument was warped and twisted. Adam had been created in the image of God, possessed of perfect holiness and an intuitive grasp of the principles of right reason, but after the fall he was no longer able to tell what should follow upon what, or to perceive the interconnections of things. Had the race been left in the plight to which he reduced it, surely it would have perished. Fortunately, however, God is merciful as well as just, and He did not utterly forsake His creatures. Knowing that men now desperately required guidance from outside themselves, God gave them explicit commands through the Prophets and through revelation; in order that all aspiration might not be extinguished among them He regenerated the wills of His chosen, and in addition, out of the superfluity of His bounty, He enabled several mortals to reconstruct, to some degree, the method which Adam had possessed in his integrity of drawing conclusions from given premises. In the Puritan conception of the human saga, the art of logic was a particular gift of God, bestowed upon fallen and hapless humanity, in order that they might not collapse in the ineptitude they had brought upon themselves.

Considered therefore in the light of logic, the fall of man had amounted in effect to a lapse from dialectic; the loss of God’s image, reduced to the most concrete terms, was simply the loss of an ability to use the syllogism, and innate depravity might most accurately be defined as a congenital incapacity for discursive reasoning. Regarded in this light, whatever mastery of logical methods the heathens, Plato and Aristotle, had achieved resulted simply from God’s being graciously willing that a few individuals should recover certain elements of the pristine rectitude in order that the whole race might not be devastated. By the same token it followed that a return to God through His grace involved also a simultaneous return to Him through logic. Grace brought men through the direct intervention of the Holy Ghost to will the truth, but the most gracious would also stand in need of logic, which had been devised “to helpe us the rather, by a naturall order, to finde out the truthe.” Both grace and logic were divine gifts, though the logic had been formulated by heathens and could be learned by the unregenerate. Pagans could not have discovered it without some divine help, as they themselves realized: their myth of Prometheus was their allegory of logic, and the fire stolen from heaven was really dialectic. Therefore Christian schools could use the texts of Greeks and Romans, and all students, elect or reprobate, could be made to learn the rules in the class-room, for the authority of logic was divine no matter who employed it. The art was not man-made, though men had written it down; it was a portion of heavenly wisdom, a replica, however faint, of the divine intelligence. Whosoever learned it approximated once more the image of God. By logic “(in some sort) is healed the wound we received in our reason by Adams fall: and this daily tryall teacheth, because by the precepts of Logicke, things hidden and darke, are clearly objected to our judgement.*”

Since we have for the purposes of this study created an issue where the Puritans themselves would have denied that one existed, in the opposition or at least in the latent tension between their piety and their learning, we are compelled to ask, in accordance with the terms of our inquiry, how in Puritan thought the piety and the intellectual heritage were reconciled, how dogma and rationality were joined, how the concepts of man as fallen and the saint as regenerated by irresistible grace were made compatible with the Puritan passion for learning, for argumentation and demonstration.

No Puritan ever believed that logic of itself could redeem. Many learned doctors were obviously outside the Covenant of Grace, and many who were uninstructed in dialectic were clearly sanctified. But since logic was a fragment of the divine mind, the saints, being joined to the divinity, must become logical. According to the doctrine of imperfect regeneration they would no more achieve perfect logicality than they would come to flawless holiness; nevertheless, by receiving grace they regained something of Adam’s original power to reason correctly. They learned the rules and methods of study, and they were given an ability to use them by conversion. God demands that men judge between truth and falsehood, and Scripture is not addressed to irrational beings. Puritan piety was formulated in logic and encased in dialectic; it was vindicated by demonstration and united to knowledge. “Logic does not teach fallacies,” said a Harvard thesis. It did not teach fallacies because it was instituted by God Himself, and what could be proved by logic was sanctioned from on high.

[…]

This veneration of logic was in part an inheritance from the past and in part a characteristic of the epoch. Neither humanism nor Protestantism had diminished the prestige with which medieval theologians invested the art. The study of antiquity generally enhanced it, and Protestantism was, in one sense, an appeal to logic for the arbitration of belief, since logic alone could interpret the Bible. Keckermann declared truly at the end of the sixteenth century that no other era in the world’s history had been so devoted to logic, produced more books, or studied it more assiduously. The necessity for logic in theology was no less than in other disciplines: “so necessary and useful to the study of theology,” said Henry Diest, “that without it there is absolutely no theology, or one maimed in body and imperfect in many respects.” Had we not logic we could not analyze texts, clear up controversies, defend ourselves against sophistry, protect ourselves against heresy. English Puritans swelled the Protestant chorus; in 1621 Richard Bernard wrote in his manual of pastoral care. The Faithfull Shepherd, that by logic are doctrines collected, confirmed, and proved; a sermon without logic, he said, “is but an ignorant discourse,” and logic therefore must be “the sterne, to guide the course of our speech, that the sudden and stormie blasts of violent affections ouerwhelme it not.”

[…]

New Englanders contributed freely to the glorification of logic. Charles Chauncy said that without logic the milk of Scripture would be soured:

Yea how shall a man know when a Scripture is wrested, or falsly applyed, or a false use is made of it, or a false consequence is drawn out of it, or a true, without some principles of logick, especially to hold forth these things to others he must needs be a shamefull workman, and many times ridiculous, neither rightly apprehending, nor dividing the word of trueth, that hath no knowledg how to interpret the Scripture.

John Eliot considered logic so important a part of Christian knowledge that he translated into Algonquin a short treatise, “to initiate the Indians in the knowledge of the Rule of Reason,” wherein he taught them that as soon as they could read the Word they must learn to analyze it. Davenport exhorted his congregation to exercise their “understanding . . . the dianoetical, discoursing faculty, whch is the seat of conclusions.” Samuel Willard told young scholars that they must know grammar and rhetoric to read Scripture, and logic “for the analysing of the Text, and finding out the Method of it, and the Arguments contained in it.” He explained to the people that “logical Analysing of the Scripture” was absolutely prerequisite to understanding it, “and do require a great deal of Time and study righdy to perform it; yea and whereof is one great reason why the Scriptures are often quoted impertinendy, and besides the genuine intention of them.”

[…]

At Harvard College, by the laws of 1646, the study of Scripture was specifically declared to involve “observations of Language and Logicke”; the laws of 1655 required that Scripture be read at morning and evening prayers and that one of the Bachelors or Sophisters “Logically analyse that which is read.” The B. A. was bestowed upon those able to read the Testaments and “to Resolve them Logically.” Samuel Mather of the class of 1643 showed nine years later how well he had studied his lessons when he wrote in the preface to Samuel Stone’s defense of Hooker, “There is no art but useth the help of Logick; nothing can shew itself to the eye of the mind of man, but in this light.”

[…]

The reign of logic in the New England mentality was an inheritance from the seventeenth century, and the rule continued unbroken until the Transcendentalists consigned consistency to the sphere of hobgoblins and Dr. Holmes wrote its epitaph in the supremely logical construction of a one-hoss shay.

 

Owen’s Fallacious Argument

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If God denies baptism to children of believers then it must be because he denies them the grace signified by baptism- John Owen
10/18/16, 5:29 PM

God having appointed baptism as the sign of regeneration, unto whom he denies it, he denies the grace signified by it. Why is it the will of God that unbelievers and impenitent sinners should not be baptized? It is because, not granting them the grace, he will not grant them the sign. If, therefore, God denies the sign unto the infant seed of believers, it must be because he denies them the grace of it; and then all the children of believing parents dying in their infancy must, without hope, be eternally damned. I do not say that all must be so who are not baptized, but all must be so whom God would have not baptized.

-John Owen, Of Infant Baptism

Some think this is a good argument. Others recognize there is something off – but it’s not easy to pinpoint precisely what. In such instances, translating an argument into syllogistic form often helps to reveal the error in logic.

  • P1: If God denies someone the grace of regeneration, he denies them the sign of regeneration.
  • P2: God denies someone the sign of regeneration.
  • C: Therefore he denies them the grace of regeneration.

That’s a logical fallacy called affirming the consequent. Thus Owen’s argument is invalid. (Which is probably why he never published that tract 😉 ).

Paul’s Enthymemes on the Law (Gal 4:4-5)

One of the questions that comes up for those studying 1689 Federalism is whether or not the Mosaic Covenant (which was a covenant of works) offered eternal life as a reward for obedience to the law. Historically, some have said yes, while others no. I (following Coxe, Owen, Renihans, Barcellos, etc) say no, the Mosaic Covenant only offered temporal life and blessings. However, two passages in particular seems to suggest I am mistaken and that the Mosaic Covenant did in fact offer eternal life and that Christ in fact earned our righteousness through the Mosaic Covenant.

For all who rely on works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, “Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the Book of the Law, and do them.” Now it is evident that no one is justified before God by the law, for “The righteous shall live by faith.” But the law is not of faith, rather “The one who does them shall live by them.” Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree”—so that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the promised Spirit through faith. (Galatians 3:10-14 ESV)

But when the fullness of time had come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons. (Galatians 4:4-5 ESV)

What are we to make of these passages which seem to teach that our blessings were earned by Christ as a reward for obedience to the Mosaic Covenant (“the law”)? Well, we need to understand Paul’s rhetoric as an enthymeme. An enthymeme is “a syllogism in which one of the premises is implicit.” Britannica explains:

in syllogistic, or traditional, logic, name of a syllogistic argument that is incompletely stated. In the argument “All insects have six legs; therefore, all wasps have six legs,” the minor premise, “All wasps are insects,” is suppressed. Any one of the propositions may be omitted—even the conclusion; but in general it is the one that comes most naturally to the mind. Often in rhetorical language the deliberate omission of one of the propositions has a dramatic effect.

Wikipedia refers to it as an “informal syllogism”

Here is an example of an informal syllogism, an enthymeme:

  • Socrates is mortal because he’s human.”
The complete formal syllogism would be the classic:
All humans are mortal. (major premise – assumed)
Socrates is human. (minor premise – stated)
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. (conclusion – stated)

While syllogisms lay out all of their premises and conclusion explicitly, enthymemes keep at least one of the premises or conclusion unsaid. The assertions left unsaid are intended to be so obvious as to not need stating.

I highly recommend that everyone take some time to listen to John Robbins’ mp3 course on logic (Course 11). Education in logic used to be a prerequisite to any formal study of a subject (such as theology). The Westminster Assembly produced The Directory for Publick Worship which includes the following rule for examination of a pastor:

He shall be examined touching his skill in the original tongues and his trial to be made by reading the Hebrew and Greek testaments and rendering some portion of them into Latin. And if he be defective in them, inquiry shall be made more strictly after his other learning and whether he hath skill in logick and philosophy.

page 72

I never received any formal logic instruction, so I’m doing my best to play catch-up. We all need to play catch-up. Logic is not common sense. It’s not something everyone knows and understands. Logic is “the rules of proper thought” or “the science of necessary inference.” It is a study of the proper way to think, and it’s something a lot of us are ignorant of (and we correct this by studying how God thinks by studying Scripture and thereby developing proper rules of thought – not by looking to “natural theology”). But back to enthymeme (from Robbins’ second lecture “Definition of Terms”):

It means an argument in which one of the premises is omitted, or understood. And he [Clark] gives the illustration of a youngster convincing his parents to let him to buy some gloves. And he doesn’t express the full argument. Most of our ordinary conversations in life are enthymemes. Some of the premises are not stated, they’re understood. It would be very burdensome, very tedious, if every time we wanted to talk to someone to repeat all the premises and ask them to agree to the conclusion. So we operate on the premise that some things are understood. It’s an ellipses, as it were, in the argument.

Some people have charged the bible with committing logical fallacies, and what they normally have in mind are enthymemes. Perhaps they’ve run across an argument in Paul’s letters where he leaves out a premise as being understood. And they say, “Look, the bible can’t be the Word of God, there’s a logical fallacy.” And all Paul has done is written down an enthymeme. The bible is written in ordinary language. It’s not written as a logic textbook or a botany textbook or a geology textbook. It’s written in ordinary language and in ordinary language, ordinary conversation, usually the complete argument is not stated. Sometimes it is.

In one of the lectures I’ll talk about Paul’s use of logic. Particularly in Romans and 1 Corinthians he states the full argument, on several occasions; no enthymemes. But you need to be aware of the existence of enthymemes when people say the bible has logical blunders in it. Then you can say, ‘Well, perhaps its just an enthymeme that perhaps you’ve overlooked.’ That will drive them to their dictionary.

Bryan Estelle shows an example of this in Galatians 3:10-12

Paul has two arguments in these verses. His first argument is in verse 10 in the form of an abbreviated syllogism. Stated most simply, the argument of Galatians 3:10 assumes the following form:

PREMISE: Cursed is everyone who does not observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law.

CONCLUSION: All who rely on the works of the law are under a curse.

The implied reconstructed minor premise would then possibly look like this:

All who rely on the works of the law do not observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law.

Paul then goes on to make another argument in verses 11 and 12, which stated most simply assumes the following form:

MAJOR PREMISE: The one who is righteous by faith shall live (v. 11b).

MINOR PREMISE: The law is not of faith (v. 12a, reinforced by v. 12b).

CONCLUSION: No one is justified (= receives life) by law (v. 11a).

Let the reader understand the apostle’s line of reasoning here. After stating the cursed condition of every person in his first argument (v. 10), the apostle states the conclusion of his second argument first (v. 11a – “no one is justified, i.e., receives entitlement to heaven, by law”) and then asserts justification is by faith (v. 11b), and furthermore, law and faith are antithetical (read = incompatible, 3:12). The logic is lucid and insuperable: Habakkuk 2:4 and Leviticus 18:5 are “two mutually exclusive soteriological statements.”

Leviticus 18:5 and Deuteronomy 30:1-14 in Biblical Theological Development (133-4)

Much of exegesis involves reconstructing the logic implicit in Scripture, making it explicit and therefore easier to understand.

Returning to Galatians 3:10-14 that we started with, the question we are addressing is how Paul can use “the law” as a reference to the Adamic Covenant in distinction from the Old Covenant. For the sake of argument, assume that I am correct in stating that only the Adamic Covenant of Works offered eternal life upon the condition of obedience to the law, and the Mosaic Covenant blessings were limited to temporal life and blessing in Canaan upon the condition of obedience to the law. (For more on this, see here)

CovenantDocuments_Old+Adamic

Paul is then appealing to the written law of the Old Covenant as representative of the law of the Covenant of Works (which was unwritten and therefore could not be quoted). In doing so, he is not claiming the Old Covenant offered eternal life. He is using the principle of works established in the Old Covenant to make a point about the obedience required from those seeking to earn by their works. A reconstruction of Paul’s enthymeme might look like:

P1 Though the rewards differ (and thus the covenants are distinct), the law was given in both the Adamic and the Old Covenants as a covenant of works (meaning they operate upon the same principle of works).

P2 I cannot quote from the Adamic Covenant because it was not written down for us.

C1 I can quote statements about the conditions of the law in the Old Covenant in order to explain the conditions of the law in the Adamic Covenant (while keeping the two covenants distinct).


P3 I can quote statements about the conditions of the law in the Old Covenant in order to explain the conditions of the law in the Adamic Covenant (while keeping the two covenants distinct).

P4 “The law” can be used as shorthand reference for the Old Covenant law principle.

C2 “The law” can be used as shorthand reference for the Adamic Covenant law principle (while keeping the two covenants distinct).


We can then unpack the logic of the verses in question to demonstrate they are not teaching that Christ earned eternal life for us through the Old Covenant.

P5 “The law” can be used as shorthand reference for Adamic Covenant law principle (while keeping the two covenants distinct).

P6 Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us.

C3 Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Adamic Covenant (in distinction from the Old Covenant).


P7 Christ was born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law

P8 “the law” can be used as shorthand reference for the law principle found in the Adamic Covenant.

C4 Christ was born under the law principle found in the Adamic Covenant.


P9 Christ was born under the law principle found in the Adamic Covenant.

P10 The law principle itself (do this and live) can be distinguished from a specific covenant.

C5 Christ was born under the principle of “Do this and live” although he was not born under the Adamic Covenant.

Long story short, understanding Scripture requires unpacking the logic implicit in the explicit statements. The simple fact that the law often has reference to the Old Covenant does not therefore mean that Christ earned our reward via the Old Covenant. Contextual clues help us know which covenant/law Paul is referring to, such as the fact that Gentiles were never under the curse of the Old Covenant, and thus could not be redeemed from it. And of course all of this assumes a distinction between the moral law itself and the moral law as a covenant of works.

See also:

A. W. Pink the “Rationalist”

The following quote from A.W. Pink is representative of Christianity down through the ages. Sadly, many today (even reformed) reject this view as “rationalism.”

HT: Reformedontheweb

The exposition made of any verse in Holy Writ must be in entire agreement with the Analogy of Faith, or that system of truth which God has made known unto His people. That, of course, calls for a comprehensive knowledge of the contents of the Bible—sure proof that no novice qualified to preach to or attempt to teach others. Such comprehensive knowledge can be obtained only by a systematic and constant reading of the Word itself—and only then is any man fitted to weigh the writings of others! Since all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, there are no contradictions therein; thus it obviously follows that any explanation given of a passage which clashes with the plain teaching of other verses is manifestly erroneous. In order for any interpretation to be valid, it must be in perfect keeping with the scheme of Divine Truth. One part of the Truth is mutually related to and dependent upon others, and therefore there is full accord between them. As Bengel said of the books of Scripture, “They indicate together one beautiful, harmonious and gloriously connected system of Truth.”

Arthur W. Pink-Interpretation of the Scriptures

Compare with Robert Reymond’s section on “Paradox as a Hermeneutical Category”

Let no one conclude from this rejection of paradox (as Marston has defined it) as a legitimate hermeneutical category that I am urging a Cartesian rationalism that presupposes the autonomy of human reason and freedom from divine revelation, a rationalism which asserts that it must begin with itself in the build-up of knowledge. But make no mistake: I am calling for a Christian rationalism that forthrightly affirms that the divine revelation which it gladly owns and makes the bedrock of all its intellectual efforts is internally self-consistent, that is, noncontradictory. Christians believe that their God is rational, that is, that he is logical. This means that he thinks and speaks in a way that indicates that the laws of logic—the law of identity (A is A), the law of noncontradiction (A is not non-A), and the law of excluded middle (A is either A or non-A)—are laws of thought original with and intrinsic to himself. This means that his knowledge is self-consistent. And because he is a God of truth he will not, indeed, he cannot lie (see Tit. 1:2; Heb. 6:18). Accordingly, just because God is rational, self-consistent, and always and necessarily truthful, we should assume that his inscripturated propositional revelation to us—the Holy Scripture—is of necessity also rational, self-consistent, and true. That this view of Holy Scripture is a common Christian conviction is borne out, I would suggest, in the consentient willingness by Christians everywhere to affirm that there are no contradictions in Scripture. The church worldwide has properly seen that the rational character of the one living and true God would of necessity have to be reflected in any propositional self-revelation which he determined to give to human beings, and accordingly has confessed the entire truthfulness (inerrancy) and noncontradictory character of the Word of God. Not to set the goal of quarrying from Scripture a harmonious theology devoid of paradoxes is to sound the death knell not only to systematic theology but also to all theology that would commend itself to men as the truth of the one living and rational God.

Reymond, Robert L. (1998-08-09). A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith: 2nd Edition – Revised and Updated (Kindle Locations 2338-2353). Thomas Nelson. Kindle Edition.